Ronald Dworkin in his much-celebrated work, Law's Empire (1986), put forth a number of diverse ideas on law's inner morality including some ground- breaking and thought-provoking notions on jurisprudence. He predominantly used American examples such as the Congress and its procedures in law-making in the hypothetical scenarios he chose to make the readers comprehend the components and values that shape the law and its structure. Dworkin propagated his idea, political integrity, in this seminal work asserting that a state is more legitimate if it holds integrity as a political virtue as opposed to the one that does not; meanwhile he rejected the social contract theory and all forms of contractarianism promulgated by classical liberal theorists. Instead, he put forth the argument that political obligation is form of associative obligation which is owed to family, friends and neighbours. He promulgated that legislative integrity as a principle should override other factors while enacting laws, but also admitted the impossibility of bringing about all diverse set of laws under a single scheme of principle. He further enquired why checkerboard laws are rejected although there is no argument of justice against them. This article will thoroughly analyse and critically evaluate the values within Dworkin's political integrity and its justifications, if any, while prudently considering the academic debate surrounding the theory.